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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
DONALD DUBOIS, #88-B-1922,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2012-0568.133
INDEX # 2012-1124
ORI #NY016015J

-againstNYS BOARD OF PAROLE,

Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Donald Dubois, verified on December 4, 2012 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on December 26, 2012. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the January 2012 determination denying
him parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. An Order to Show
Cause was issued on January 7, 2013. Respondent initially moved to dismiss based upon
petitioner’s alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies through the administrative
appeal process set forth in 9 NYCRR Part 8006. By Decision and Order dated April 18,
2013, however, respondent’s motion to dismiss was denied as withdrawn and it was
directed to submit answering papers. The Court has since received and reviewed
respondent’s Answer and Return, including in camera materials, verified on July 30,
2013, as well as the July 30, 2013 Letter Memorandum of Hilary D. Rogers, Esq.,
Assistant Attorney General. No Reply thereto has been received from petitioner.
On September 14, 1988 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, Queens
County, to a controlling indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life upon his convictions
of the crimes of Murder 2° and Criminal Possession of a Weapon 2° (two counts).
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Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to the Appellate Division, Second
Department, People v. Dubois, 170 AD2d 528, lv den 77 NY2d 960.
Petitioner made his initial appearance before a Parole Board on January 11, 2012.
Following that appearance a decision was rendered denying him parole and directing he
be held for an additional 24 months. The parole denial determination reads as follows:
“AFTER CAREFUL REVIEW OF THE RECORD, YOUR APPEARANCE
BEFORE THE PAROLE BOARD AND DELIBERATION, PAROLE IS
DENIED. THE I.O. [Instant Offense] MURDER 2ND AND CPW 1ST
INVOLVED YOU BEING FOUND GUILTY IN THE SHOOTING DEATH OF
A MALE VICTIM. THIS BEHAVIOR DEMONSTRATES A DEPRAVED
INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE. DURING YOUR INCARCERATION
YOU HAVE RECEIVED APPROXIMATELY 40 TIER II AND 12 TIER III
DISCIPLINARY INFRACTIONS WITH THE MOST RECENT TIER II
OCCURRING IN DECEMBER, 2011 FOR VIOLENT CONDUCT,
FIGHTING, CREATING A DISTURBANCE AND DIRECT ORDER.
ADDITIONALLY YOUR FILE CONTAINS NO LEGITIMATE RELEASE
PLAN. THAT YOU HAVE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE DISCIPLINARY
INFRACTIONS AFTER ALL THIS TIME IN PRISON IS OF GREAT
CONCERN TO THIS PANEL. DURING YOUR INTERVIEW YOU
APPEARED INDIFFERENT TO [this?] FACT.
WE FIND YOUR RELEASE INCOMPATIBLE WITH PUBLIC SAFETY AND
WELFARE. PAROLE IS THEREFORE DENIED.”
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
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services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d
614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
The sole cause of action asserted by petitioner is based upon the alleged
“ . . . failure of the Parole Board to properly follow the guidelines of the Amended
Executive Law §259-c(4) regarding the assessment of persons appearing before parole for
consideration for release.” According to petitioner, when he appeared before the Parole
Board “ . . . the only thing that the Board talked about was the petitioner being involved
with a murder and that demonstrated a depraved indifference to human life on
petitioner’s behalf, the board also brought up a ticket that the petitioner had been charged
with which was his first in several years. At no time did the Parole Board talk about
petitioner’s programing, achievements or productive actions, there was no future risk
assessment, that the new amendments to the Executive law §259-c(4) has mandated the
Parole to do.” (Emphasis added).
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Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b,
effective October 1, 2011, to provide that the New York State Board of Parole shall “. . .
establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law.
Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the
rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such
persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining
which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”1
As part of its consideration of petitioner’s sole cause of action the Court finds it
appropriate to consider the October 5, 2011 Memorandum of Andrea W. Evans, then
Chairwoman, New York State Board of Parole, addressing the amendments to Executive
Law §259-c(4) (hereinafter, the “Evans Memorandum”). A copy of the Evans
Memorandum is annexed to the July 30, 2013 Letter Memorandum of Hilary D. Rogers,
Esq., Assistant Attorney General. In the Evans Memorandum the former Chairwoman
wrote, in part, as follows:
“. . . [M]embers of the [Parole] Board had been working with staff of the
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision in the development
of a transition accountability plan (‘TAP’). This instrument which
incorporates risk and needs principles, will provide a meaningful
measurement of an inmate’s rehabilitation. With respect to the practices
of the Board, the TAP instrument will replace the inmate status report that
you have utilized in the past when assessing the appropriateness of an
inmate’s release to parole supervision. To this end, members of the Board
were afforded training in July 2011 in the use of the TAP instrument where
it exists. Accordingly, as we proceed, when staff have prepared a TAP
instrument for a parole eligible inmate, you are to use that document when
making your parole release decisions. In instances where a TAP instrument
has not been prepared, you are to continue to utilize the inmate status
report. It is also important to note that the Board was afforded training in
1

Prior to the amendment the statute had provided, in relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall
“. . . establish written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such written
guidelines may consider the use of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist members of the state
board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”
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September 2011 in the usage of the Compas Risk and Needs Assessment
tool [COMPAS] to understand the interplay between that instrument and
the TAP instrument, as well as understanding what each of the risk levels
mean.”
The Evans Memorandum goes on to state “. . . that the standard for assessing the
appropriateness for release, as well as the statutory criteria you must consider [Executive
Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)] has not changed through the aforementioned legislation
[amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4)] . . .” After specifically setting forth the statutory
factors set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), the Evans Memorandum concludes as
follows:
“Therefore, in your consideration of the statutory criteria set forth in
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)(i) through (viii), you must ascertain what
steps an inmate has taken toward their rehabilitation and the likelihood of
their success once released to parole supervision. In this regard, any steps
taken by an inmate towards effecting their rehabilitation, in addition to all
aspects of their proposed release plan, are to be discussed with the inmate
during the course of their interview and considered in your deliberations.”
When confronted with issue of whether or not the Evans Memorandum, which has
apparently not been adopted as a formal rule (see Executive Law 259-c(11) and State
Administrative Procedure Act §§202 and 203), can lawfully constitute the “written
procedures” mandated pursuant to the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4),
lower courts have reached different conclusions. Compare Morris v. New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 40 Misc 3d 226 [Sup Ct
Columbia County, April 12, 2013] with Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc 3d 896 [Sup Ct Albany
County, June 28, 2013]. Although this specific issue has not been addressed at the
appellate level, the Appellate Division, Third Department, has overturned a parole denial
determination based upon the Board’s failure to utilize a COMPAS risk and needs
assessment instrument in connection with an October 2011 hearing. See Garfield v.
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Evans, 108 AD3d 830. See also Malerba v. Evans, 109 AD3d 1067. In reaching its
decision the Garfield court found as follows:
“Significantly, Executive Law §259-c(4) requires that the Board ‘establish
written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by
law,’ and the Board acknowledges that the statute requires it to incorporate
risk and needs principals into its decision-making process. According to the
record, the Board was trained in the use of the COMPAS instrument prior
to petitioner’s hearing. Moreover, the Board acknowledges that it has used
the COMPAS instrument since February 2012 and will use it for petitioner’s
next appearance. Under these circumstances, we find no justification for
the Board’s failure to use the COMPAS instrument at petitioner’s October
2011 hearing. Accordingly, we agree with petitioner that he is entitled to a
new hearing. Given this result, it is unnecessary to address petitioner’s
remaining contentions.”
In the absence of any indication in the record that a TAP and/or COMPAS risk and
needs assessment instrument was utilized in connection with petitioner’s January 11, 2012
Parole Board appearance and the ensuing parole denial determination, this Court finds
the decision of the Appellate Division, Third Department in Garfield to be dispositive and,
therefore, further finds that the parole denial determination in the case at bar must be
overturned with a de novo hearing ordered.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is granted, without costs and disbursements, but
only to the extent that the January 2012 parole denial determination is vacated and the
matter remanded for de novo parole release consideration, before a different Parole
Board, within 45 days of the date of this Decision and Judgment, in a manner not
inconsistent with this Decision and Judgment.
Dated:

October 18, 2013 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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